2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-26-2011

Edward Fernandez v. Rose Trucking

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

Recommended Citation
"Edward Fernandez v. Rose Trucking" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1192.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1192

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3409
___________
EDWARD J. FERNANDEZ,
Appellant
v.
ROSE TRUCKING and WHITE ROSE FOODS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-04915)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 9, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 26, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
In September 2009, Edward J. Fernandez filed a Title VII employment
discrimination complaint, which he later amended, in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey. He alleged that the defendants, Rose Trucking and White
Rose Foods, “fire[d] [him] because of injuries . . . sustained while under [their]

employment.”

The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint, based on

Fernandez’s concession that he had not filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 262 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“Before bringing suit under Title VII in federal court, a plaintiff must first file
a charge with the EEOC.”). Fernandez appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District
Court’s order is plenary. See Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir.
2000).
A plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim under Title VII must
exhaust his administrative remedies by complying with the procedural requirements set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Those requirements include filing a complaint with the
EEOC or its state equivalent within 300 days of the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not affect the District
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, however. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021
(3d Cir. 1997) (citing Hornsby v. U.S. Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986)).
Rather, failure to exhaust in Title VII cases, which is akin to failing to comply with a
statute of limitations, is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant.
Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997).

Nevertheless, we have

recognized that sua sponte dismissal may be appropriate where the plaintiff concedes that
he failed to exhaust. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002).
Fernandez made such a concession here. In his amended complaint, Fernandez
clearly indicated that he did not file an administrative charge prior to bringing suit in
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federal court. Specifically, Fernandez stated that “when I became aware that I could
proce[e]d with the EEOC, I was told by that office that the time limit . . . had expire[d].
The lack of knowledge in the detailed steps made me ignorant to the fact that I could
obtain a right to sue letter.” He also admitted, “I was not aware that I could contact the
N.J. Division on Civil Rights in this matter.” Nowhere has Fernandez claimed that he
pursued his administrative remedies with the EEOC or that he is entitled to equitable
tolling. See Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1021 (stating that “in Title VII cases courts are
permitted in certain limited circumstances to equitably toll filing requirements, even if
there has been a complete failure to file . . . .”).

Therefore, under these limited

circumstances, we conclude that the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Fernandez’s
complaint for failure to exhaust was proper.
For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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